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Introduction
The share of shadow economy in Bulgaria as a percentage of GDP for the period 
1999-2007 is 35% and the country is in the first half of the ranking among 120 
countries (Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010). In the period 2008-2014 
the share of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP in Bulgaria is almost 
the same -31% and the country take the first place in the ranking among other 
European countries and get ahead of many developing economies (Schneider, 
Raczkowski and Mróz, 2015). For example, the shadow economy as a percentage 
of GDP in Germany is 13.3%, and in Slovakia it is 14.6% for the same period.
The current study assumes that some of the reasons for the large share of 
shadow economy in Bulgaria as a percentage of GDP due to the large transaction 
costs level. In this regard, the main objective of the research is to identify and 
measure those transaction costs which are typical for the trade litigations in 
Bulgaria (Code of Civil Procedure 2007, art. 365-378) in order to be minimized. In 
accordance with the institutional economics theory, the trade litigation is defined 
as a type of transaction cost in relation to the process of enforced execution of the 
commercial contract (Dahlman, 1979). In this regard, the institutional failures of 
the court proceedings could increase the total transaction costs for both parties 
of the trade. 
The limitations and the format of the research impose its subject to be narrowed 
to studying the transaction costs of trade litigations in Bulgaria, caused by the 
institutional failures of the forensic accounting expertise.
The main thesis of the study is that the failures of the institutional environ-
ment of trade litigations increase transaction costs and cause unpredictability 
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of the commercial contracts performance. This leads also to reduced econom-
ic activity of the companies. 
In accordance with the thesis, the following tasks will be solved: 
1. The failures of the institutional environment of trade litigations in Bulgaria 
will be identified;
2. An econometric model for transaction costs measurement of trade litigations 
as a result of the institutional environment failures will be elaborated.
The significance of the research is related to the development of the transaction 
costs theory. There are many studies which examine transaction costs in the 
first two phases of the commercial contract development: the phase of finding 
counterparty and the phase of negotiation and signing of the contract. However, 
there are few studies related to the third phase of the contract, which examines 
the transaction costs caused by its execution. Moreover, the studies, related to the 
transaction costs caused by the enforced commercial contract execution by the 
Court are fewer. In the literature review this fact will be explained. 
Having in mind the aforementioned, the significance of the research is related 
both to the transaction costs identification as a result of the enforced execution 
of the commercial contract and the implementation of an econometric model for 
their measurement. This will help the total transaction costs of trade litigations to 
be measured more accurately. 
Literature Review
There are some papers that identify the concept of the transaction costs in the 
court proceedings. For example the research of Kessler and Rubinfeld (2007) 
where through an empirical analysis of the court records, the impact of the law 
(implication and alternative amendments) over the trade litigation and the related 
transaction costs is examined. There it is made a comparison among the transac-
tion costs of the formal litigation and the opportunity for out-of-court dispute 
resolution. Transaction costs are identified in terms of benefits for both parties in 
the transaction as a result of an out-of-court dispute resolution. The model itself 
consists of those types of transaction costs which are not related to the risk of 
wrong court decision. The model does not identify the institutional environment 
failures and the ways they could be overcome.
Another similar publication is that of Reda (2011). He finds out that trade 
litigation could redirect the transaction costs (change their places) for both par-
ties. Moreover, the transaction costs related to bringing claims against large cor-
porations are much greater. This fact impacts not over the justice but also the 
economic turnover. He also examines the impact over the costs and the outcome 
of the legal case when the legal representation is done by large law companies 
or self-employed lawyers. The main principles for identifying the trade litigation 
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as an effective one: fairness, speed litigation and accessibility, are also studied in 
this publication. The main accent of the study is put on the reduction of the court 
costs as a result of the improvement of the access to justice. The cited author has 
not presented a statistical or econometrical model, related to the court costs mea-
surement, in his publication. The author examined various elements of the court 
costs and he put them into various categories. He referred to statistical data and 
other authors’ publications. The analysis of the transaction costs takes small part 
of Reda’s research. 
This issue is also addressed in OECD publications (e.g. Palumbo et al.  2013). 
There it is found that the case length could be an obstacle and hamper the eco-
nomic activity. It is also stated that the high length of overall cases results in 
higher transaction costs for companies. The structure of the litigation costs, as 
well as the courts’ structure is used as main determinants for the needs of the cited 
publication. The predictability of court decisions, which reduces both the case 
length and likelihood of appeals, is introduced as an additional determinant. In the 
conclusions, it is stated that the well-functioning judicial systems are key factor 
for the economic development. They reduce the transaction costs and guarantee 
security for the contracts’ execution as well as reduce the opportunistic behavior 
of the economic agents. In the cited publication, transaction costs are examined 
on macroeconomic level and the analysis is made on the basis of a comparative 
analysis among different countries. 
Among the Bulgarian authors, there could be mentioned the publications 
of Sedlarski (2008) and of Tchobanov, Egbert and Sedlarski (2008). In both 
publications, the justice is defined as a transaction service, provided by the public 
sector. The authors find that the delayed reform of the judicial system leads to 
obstacles for the courts to enforce the law, which fact impacts over the sum of 
transaction costs of litigations and the economic activity. The transaction costs 
are studied on macroeconomic level and a relationship between the dynamics of 
the transaction costs and economic growth is made. 
The main purpose of the current research is transaction costs to be examined 
on microeconomic level. 
1. Identifying the failures of the institutional environment 
In accordance with the limitations of the current research, the identification of 
the transaction costs will be focused on the institutional system of the forensic 
accounting expertise of trade litigations. Moreover, the institutional system 
will be studied in accordance with the last amendments of the Bulgarian 
legislation since 2017. 
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The failures of the institutional environment are summarized as a result of 
the analysis of commercial law cases which are publicly available in the legal-
information systems (e.g. APIS, SIELA and etc.). 
First institutional failure: lack of competence of the forensic  
accounting expert witnesses
This institutional failure is related to the opportunity an expert witness with 
a three-year college education (currently referred to the educational degree 
“professional bachelor“) and with a vague practical experience in the field of 
Accounting to check the work of an experienced certified accountant or of 
an expert with a chartered certified accountant qualification (ACCA). When 
analyzing the commercial court cases, the authors have identified similar cases in 
the Official Journal of the Republic of Bulgaria concerning expert witnesses. 
In accordance with the most recent amendments of Ordinance 2/2015 
regulating the statutes of the expert witnesses, every expert witness must 
hold an educational degree or qualification concerning the type of expertise 
he works on and have at least 5 years’ experience in the relevant specialty 
(Ordinance 2/2015, art.7, para.1-2). Ordinance 2/2015 is too general and does not 
distinguish individual requirements for carrying out different types of expertise, 
including forensic accounting expertise. Consequently, the general requirements 
for financial statements compilation in accordance with the Accountancy Act must 
be applied, which means that these requirements are the minimal requirements for 
an expert to be nominated as a forensic accounting expert witness (Accountancy 
Act 2015, art.18, para.1). The most recent amendments of the Accountancy 
Act, concerning the education of financial statement compilers assume that 
persons holding college economic education or higher economic education 
could be hired as financial statement compilers. In this regard, the minimum 
qualification requirements for a forensic accounting expert witness, who 
will check the work of experts holding master’s degree in accounting or are 
experienced certified accountants, regards only to having a college economic 
education or just graduated any economic specialty no matter it is in the field 
of accountancy. 
In accordance with the cited law acts, together with the minimum requirements 
for education of the expert witnesses, there is also a requirement for 5 years’ 
experience in the relevant specialty. As in the Ordinance 2/2015, it is not stated 
what kind of experience is defined as an experience in the field of accountancy, 
consequently there will be applied the general rules of the Accountancy Act, 
concerning the requirements for financial statement compilers. In accordance 
with the Accountancy Act as an experience in the field of accountancy is assumed 
the experience in the field of internal and external audit, financial inspection, tax 
127Transaction costs and institutional change of trade...
audits as well as experience as a teacher in accountancy and financial control. 
However, in the Accountancy Act it is not specified which occupations are 
assumed as an experience in the field of accountancy. These occupations are 
defined in the National Classificatory of the Professions and Occupations in the 
Republic of Bulgaria (2011). According to this act except for accountants, other 
occupations in the field of accountancy which are assumed as an experience in 
the field of accountancy are also cashiers and invoice clerks. 
In this regard, the minimum requirements for an experience of forensic 
accounting expert witnesses are formal. Actually, the Ordinance 2/2015 does not 
contain any specific requirements for forensic accounting expertise and also does 
not refer to any other applicable legal act. Even though one of the requirements 
of the Ordinance for taking an occupation in the field of accountancy is to be 
submitted a copy of the employment record book of the applicant, it is still unclear 
what kind of experience is assumed as an experience in the field of accountancy. 
It is not also clear if people who certify the registration of expert witnesses use 
the requirements of other legal acts as analogy, such as those concerning the 
registration of the financial statements compilers or the National Classificatory of 
the Professions and Occupations in the Republic of Bulgaria.
As a result of the aforementioned, it is proved that the legislation in the 
Republic of Bulgaria assumes registration of forensic accounting expert 
witnesses who have college economic education or high education in the field of 
accountancy and an experience in occupations such as cashiers or invoice clerks. 
These persons are assigned by the Commercial Court to check the accounting 
audit of large corporations and consortiums whose financial reports are prepared 
by experienced certified accountants or by experts with a chartered certified 
accountant qualification.
Second institutional failure: the possibility of a conflict of interests 
and non-objectivity in the assignment of a second expertise by another 
forensic accounting expert witness.
This is the case when the initial expert witness who has prepared the forensic 
accounting expertise and the newly appointed expert witness who is accustomed 
to repeat the expertise are members of the same joint venture, established for 
private benefit. There are several alliances where most of the expert witnesses in 
the Republic of Bulgaria belong to. These organizations are officially registered 
in the Court as the content of their statutes is available in the relevant Court 
registers. For example on the web page of one of the expert witnesses organizations 
the following text is written: „the organization is established on the basis of an 
existing structure of professional relationships among acting, recognized and 
proved experts, expert witnesses and experts in the field of court arbitration. “
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In the statute of the organization it is clearly written that all of its members 
are in a relationship one to another. In addition, the organization is established 
for private benefit by carrying out an economic activity which results in 
property interests for its members: 
„…The alliance of the expert witnesses …is specialized in the provision 
of highly professional expert services and consultations by a team of expert 
witnesses and experts in the relevant fields“, „The expert witnesses .... work 
as a team, which fact guarantees the high quality of the services provided “.
In general, the publicly provision of services by these organizations 
make them economic entities, moreover they are registered in the Court as 
organizations for private benefit. It is also written in their statutes that the 
expert witnesses work as a team in the provision of services. Once such 
organisations are economic entities, even though they do not share profit, 
the money, earned through the economic activity of the organisations could 
be spent for things that are of benefit for their members. For example, the 
members of such organizations could benefit from attending education courses 
for professional qualification, expensive equipment, buildings in different 
cities which make easier the work of the forensic accounting expert witnesses 
and etc. At the same time these experts receive direct payments by the Court 
for the work they have done.
Having in mind the aforementioned, it is obvious that the expert 
witnesses who has to repeat the initial forensic accounting expertise, done by 
his colleague who is a member of the same alliance of the expert witnesses, 
will have an interest to confirm the initial expertise. Otherwise, this expert 
witness will risk to be deprived from using the expensive equipment, or 
attending qualification courses as a member of the alliance. This institutional 
failure could be overcome if the Court of Justice constitutes the membership 
in alliances of expert witnesses which are established for private benefit, as a 
potential conflict of interests.
2. Definition of the research model
The research model is developed on the basis of the model presented by Kessler 
and Rubinfeld (2007) which was mentioned in the introduction of the current 
study. The cited model compares the benefits of the likelihood the civil claim to 
be won and the benefits of signing a court settlement agreement:
 G = (Tp-Td) + (c
tp
 + c
td
)> 0 (1)
where
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Tp (Td) = subjective value to plaintiff (defendant) associated with a successful 
trial outcome; c
tp
 (c
td
) = cost to plaintiff if the case is settled
Then according to equation (1) the case will be settled if G>0.
The model of Kessler and Rubinfeld (2007) does not take into account the 
risk coefficient of wrong court decision. On the other hand, the model takes into 
account the sum of the subjective value to plaintiff (defendant) and the costs if the 
case is settled. The authors of the current study think that the concept of Kessler 
and Rubinfeld’s model should be essentially modified. The court costs must be 
deducted from the net subjective value to the plaintiff (defendant) and at the same 
time the risk of wrong court decision must also be taken into account. 
As a result of equation (1), it could be created a model for measuring the 
transaction costs in the following conditions: the execution of the signed contract 
is enforced by the Court, the costs are discussed before the beginning of the 
trial and the contracting parties have made a strategic and rational choice what 
to do. The model considers the viewpoint of the plaintiff. (This is the party 
who considers its duties in the contract to be discharged). For that purpose, the 
following equation could be used:
 TC =[(Tp-Td)-(c
tp1
 + c
td1
)]x Cf
r 
(2)
Where:
c
tp1
 (c
td1
) = direct trial costs to the plaintiff (defendant), 
 Cf
r 
(risk coefficient) = (Z + Kb + t
l
) –(Y + Ka + t
s
) (3)
Z is the likelihood the forensic accounting expertise to be incompetent or 
dishonest;
Kb is the absence of predictability and equation of results of the Court decision 
in accordance with art. 365-378 of the Civil Code of Procedure;
tl is the long duration of trial (over one year), reported by the commercial law 
cases;
Y is the presence of preliminary court precautionary measures in accordance 
with art. 390 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
Ka is the presence of predictability and equation of the results of the Court 
decisions reported by the commercial law cases in art. 365-378 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure;
t
s
 is the short duration of trial (under one year), reported by the commercial 
law cases;
The value of each determinant in the equation for measuring the risk coefficient 
(Cf
r) 
equals 1 in the presence of the condition or equals 0 in the absence of the 
condition.
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Empirical testing
First hypothesis: The plaintiff has brought a claim for 100 000 euro and the 
defendant confirm the claim or expect the Court to confirm only 80% of the 
claim. The trial costs are 9 000 euro for each party in the contract. The values of 
the determinants necessary for measuring of the risk coefficient are: Z=1, Kb=1, 
t
l
=1; Y=1, Ka=0, t
s
=0; After the necessary calculations are done, the transaction 
costs for settling the agreement before the beginning of the trial according to this 
hypothesis are expected to be 4 000 euro, which sum is 4% of the sum of the 
claim. This means that the transaction costs of the process of enforced execution 
of the contract are low. In this regard the rational behavior of the plaintiff is 
to bring the lawsuit but the rational behavior of the defendant is to suggest a 
settlement agreement.
Second hypothesis: The plaintiff has brought a claim for 100 000 euro and 
the defendant confirm the claim or expect the Court to confirm only 50% of the 
claim. The trial costs are again 9 000 euro for each party in the contract. The 
values of the determinants necessary for measuring of the risk coefficient are 
the same as in the first hypothesis: Z=1, Kb=1, t
l 
=1; Y=1, Ka=0, t
s 
=0; After the 
necessary calculations are done, the transaction costs for settling the agreement 
before the beginning of the trial according to this hypothesis are expected to be 
64 000 euro, which is 64% of the sum of the claim. The transaction costs of the 
plaintiff are high and it is better for him to suggest the defendant a settlement 
agreement.
Third hypothesis: The plaintiff has brought a claim for 100 000 euro and the 
defendant confirm the claim or expect the Court to confirm only 90% of the claim. 
The authors of the current research consider this hypothesis as an impossible one. 
If the defendant confirms over 80% of the claim, it is rationally for him to suggest 
a settlement agreement to the plaintiff.
Conclusion
The current research identified the institutional failures of the legislation 
concerning trade litigations through analysis of the rules according to which 
forensic accounting expertise is made. This expertise is of great importance for 
the final court decision, because through an accounting procedure it is examined 
the claim of the party who pretends for incomplete and inaccurate commercial 
contract execution. As the Court is not specialized in the field of accountancy, the 
conclusions of the forensic accounting expert witnesses are of great significance 
for the court decisions. That is why the current research is focused on this issue. 
The proposed model shows that the overcoming of the institutional failures in 
the field of forensic accounting expertise will result in lower transaction costs as 
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a result of the enforced execution of the commercial contract. As a result of the 
limitations of the study, many institutional failures of trade litigations were not 
mentioned. For example, is it allowed by the legislation a forensic accounting 
expert witness to make thousands of expertise per year and still there are no legal 
restrictions in this field and etc.
After the fulfilment of the institutional changes in the period 2015-2017, 
no improvement of the rules, regulating the settlement of trade litigations in 
Bulgaria is observed. In 2015 a new Ordinance, regulating the statute of forensic 
accounting expert witnesses and new Accountancy Act were adopted. Over the 
past two years, since the implementation of these legal acts, many failures in the 
field of forensic accounting expertise of trade litigations are identified. 
Having in mind the aforementioned, the present research could raise a 
discussion about the opportunities how the transaction costs in trials to be reduced 
as well as how the effectiveness of the reform of the judicial system, measured 
through the institutional environment failures to be assessed.
On the next place, a model for measuring transaction costs of trade litigations 
is presented in the current study. This model could be successfully used for 
improving the concept of measuring the aggregated transaction costs. The risk 
coefficient was not presented as a component of the equations in other models, 
examined in the literature review. Consequently, the introduction of this risk 
coefficient in the presented model in the current research is the main contribution 
of the study. The empirical testing of the model shows that it could be successfully 
put into the practice. 
There are many studies related to the market investigation and signing of 
contracts, but there are few studies related to the enforced contracts execution. 
The transaction costs related to the enforced contract execution (court costs) are 
still not studied in depth. Detailed statistical or econometrical studies are also 
missing in this field. Consequently, the accurate and overall identification of the 
transaction costs is hindered. The current research contributes to the accurate 
identification and measurement of the transaction costs of trade litigations and 
allows better empirical testing in the field of enforced contracts execution. 
In this regard the present study is addressed to a wide range of experts. For 
example, in economic theory context it will be useful for the experts who carry out 
studies in the field of shadow economy, transaction costs, behavioral economics 
and microeconomics. The results of the present study could also be helpful to the 
practice, especially for the contract management, the reduction of hidden costs 
and to the risk management of contracts non-performance. 
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